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Market socialism — or “the socialist market economy” — in China has practically
reinforced the rural-urban divide in social welfare. The danwei welfare system for
urban workers has remained robust, albeit currently through different programs for
social security, so that Chinese-style socialism still governs the lives of most urban
workers. The market-based and/or private arrangements for social insurances and ser-
vices complement, not replace, the danwei-supported welfare programs. In contrast,
the demise of rural collective institutions has caused a desocialization of peasant wel-
fare in most villages across China, as individual families are urged to self-support on
the basis of private economic and social resources. Essentially, welfare ruralism
exhorts primarily peasants (and peasant migrants) to revitalize their traditional values
and functions for familial social support, in lieu of state-sponsored social security pro-
grams or social services. What Gordon White dubbed as “post-communist neo-
Confucianism” regarding the Chinese welfare tradition has been asymmetrically
enforced onto rural population due to complicated historical, structural, and political
factors. Welfare ruralism is a sort of internal orientalism applied to peasant welfare for
which ideological and cultural work, as opposed to institutional and economic work for
urban worker welfare, is the main mechanism for reform.
INTRODUCTION
Pre-reform collective organizations in China were intended to eliminate
any need for separate welfare policies through “rectified” social relations of
production for the entire peasant population. In contrast, the family-based,
market-oriented economic activities in the reform period tend to present
threats to secure income opportunities, and thus necessitate independent wel-
fare mechanisms in villages. While some people have been allowed to “get
rich first” (Deng, 1987: 12) under the liberal development strategy of market
socialism, many others have been left impoverished and unprotected
(Hinton, 1990). Moreover, the Chinese population is now ‘aging’ rapidly,
mainly as a result of the effective family planning effort.
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In the reform period, institutional decollectivization led to an inescapable
result of threatening the already feeble financial and organizational founda-
tions of the rural welfare system that had operated as part of the collective
production organizations. To worsen matters, the personnel of rural welfare
institutions, such as barefoot doctors, are increasingly lured into personal-
ized professional service sectors under the marketized economic environ-
ment. In addition, the fiscal crisis of the Chinese state makes it difficult to
financially compensate for the weakened collective welfare. It is critical that
all these setbacks are occurring when social groups in need of welfare bene-
fits are rapidly increasing. 
There may be three theoretical options to be considered to cope with the
crisis of the welfare system in rural China — namely, the adoption and
expansion of state-managed public welfare programs, the privatization and
marketization of welfare services, and the activation of self-help groups
such as family and kin. More than two decades of rural reform seem to
enable an overall judgment concerning which direction rural welfare has
been transforming. Most local and foreign scholars concur that the encour-
agement of local self-help among the members of family and kin has been
the main policy position of the Beijing leadership. In particular, rural fami-
lies have been openly exhorted to reinforce their traditional functions of
social support for the elderly, children, widowed persons, and ill or handi-
capped persons. 
Family functions in supporting the elderly and other vulnerable persons,
and in internally sharing frequent economic destitution, had been acknowl-
edged and encouraged by the Chinese state, even before rural reform. One
exception was the communalization drive in the late 1950s, when everyday
life was tightly organized by various collective arrangements for child care,
elderly care, laundry, sewing, dining, and sometimes even sleeping.
Similarly, the pre-reform rural welfare systems in general were much worse
equipped and financed than the urban welfare systems. Even the much
publicized “five guarantees” were mostly provided by the family itself,
while the redistributive mechanism of collective funds played a supplemen-
tary role at best. 
In the post-Mao era, the Chinese state has further increased its depen-
dence on familial social support, as well as on the mutual aid tradition
among peasant families. As Chow (1988: 74) observed, “nearly all proposals
for a new social security system stressed the important roles of the family
system and the local communities.” Thus, the main burden of economically
and socially protecting needy or handicapped persons has fallen on the
family, among both poor and rich segments of the rural population.
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Currently, individual peasant families assume not only production responsi-
bilities but also welfare responsibilities. The former are formally stipulated,
whereas the latter are implicitly — and perhaps deceptively — entrusted.
The Chinese state, confronted with a mounting financial crisis and the
weakening of its organizational control of villages, has opted to revitalize
the welfare functions of the peasant family, in an effort to impose a sort of
household welfare responsibility system. 
Although the use of the familial organization for rural welfare still needs
to be supported with tax benefits and other comprehensive state supports,
the Chinese state has merely issued frequent calls for rural welfare reform,
instead of launching decisive policy measures. The success or effectiveness
of this strategic dependence on the family will be largely determined by the
extent of economic inequality and social differentiation created in the mar-
ketplace. The irony is that those families that are less successful in capturing
new private economic opportunities — and thus need welfare protection —
are also less likely to have sufficient family resources and networks for self-
support. 
It is far from unusual that a poor country like China would try to mobilize
grassroots traditions and morals for familial self-support in solving the wel-
fare needs of various needy or handicapped people. Even in advanced
countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, conservative
politicians have often called for family values to replace public welfare.
However, this policy necessity in China has been unevenly applied between
rural and urban areas. In stark contrast to openly neglected peasant welfare,
there has been a wide array of political efforts to ensure the stability of
workers’ welfare, particularly in state enterprises. 
Well into the 1990s, the comprehensive danwei (work unit) welfare system
— a core element of Chinese-style socialism — was not significantly dis-
mantled for most regular employees in state enterprises, even when many
of them were generating severe losses. In fact, numerous loss-generating
enterprises were saved from bankruptcy primarily for the sake of their
employees’ jobs and welfare. The recent adoption of co-payment schemes
for social insurance programs for old-age support, health care, unemploy-
ment, and industrial accidents has not relieved most state enterprises of
such welfare burdens in any meaningful sense, since their expenses for
social insurance premiums and in-company social services roughly amount
to total wage payments. The proportion of regular employees in state enter-
prises has continued to decline, and unemployed and underemployed
workers suffer from severe poverty and insecurity in rapidly growing num-
bers. However, these unfortunate workers still constitute a minority, and are
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given special considerations in economic activities wherever available.
Besides, many of them would enjoy even better material lives by working in
lucrative private and/or foreign enterprises. Also, the privatization and
marketization of social services such as education, medicine, and housing
have rapidly occurred in urban areas. However, much of this trend reflects
the growing demands of affluent urban residents for better-quality schools,
hospitals, and houses. 
Market socialism — or “the socialist market economy” — in China has
practically reinforced the rural-urban divide in social welfare.1 Field studies
consistently report that the danwei welfare system for urban workers has
remained robust, albeit now through different programs for social security,
so that Chinese-style socialism still governs most urban workers’ lives. The
market-based and/or private arrangements for social insurances and ser-
vices complement, not replace, the danwei-supported welfare programs. In
contrast, the demise of rural collective institutions has caused a desocializa-
tion of peasant welfare in most villages across China, as individual families
are urged to self-support on the basis of private economic and social
resources. A sort of welfare ruralism has exhorted mainly peasants (and peas-
ant migrants) to revitalize their traditional values and functions for familial
social support, in place of state-sponsored social security programs or social
services. What Gordon White (1998: 192) dubbed “post-communist neo-
Confucianism, involving the conscious manufacture of a set of alleged
truths about the Chinese welfare heritage,” has been asymmetrically
enforced onto rural population due to “the over-determining role of histori-
cal, structural and political factors in shaping the trajectory of Chinese wel-
fare reform” (White, 1998: 194). Welfare ruralism is an internal orientalism
applied to peasant welfare for which ideological and cultural work — as
opposed to institutional and economic work for urban worker welfare — is
the primary tool of reform. 
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1 While the Beijing leadership may not accept that its welfare reform policy has exacerbated
the rural-urban disparities, it at least acknowledges ever-widening rural-urban inequalities as
the most critical problem of “the socialist market economy” in China. In ‘The Decisions of the
Party Center concerning the Improvement of the Social Market Economic System’ released on
October 21, 2003, the party-state listed the redressing of urban-rural disparities as the first
goal of state work for the next ten years (www.yonhapews.co.kr, October 22, 2003).
MAOIST SOCIALISM AND RURALIST WELFARE
Peasant Welfare in the Maoist Era
In spite of historical shifts in its contents, rural welfare in Mao-era China
embodied the Marxist ideology that rectification of the social relations of
production, rather than philanthropy, should be pursued to deal with needy
and disadvantaged people. Separate social welfare was not an essential con-
cern in initiating a Marxist revolution and building Communism in a post-
revolutionary society. The socialist economic system was supposed to do
away with exploitative relations of production that were responsible for
poverty and insecurity. If some individuals suffered from poverty, it sig-
naled that the socialist system itself should be further perfected, and not
that a separate welfare system should be developed.2 Physically handi-
capped people, elderly and children should be universally protected and
supported in communal living arrangements, and not through categorical
assistance prescribed in administrative welfare programs. These positions
were amply illustrated in China’s pre-reform policies and practices concern-
ing social welfare.
In Chinese villages under socialism, there were no separate institutional
arrangements for welfare, other than collective work organizations. These
collective work organizations arranged material assistance for needy mem-
bers and families as entitlements or rights, rather than as charities.
According to Hussain and Feuchtwang (1988: 38), however, such entitle-
ments were “concerned less with providing assistance than minimizing the
numbers needing assistance by instituting a formidable array of social and
economic imperatives for self-sustenance.” The main purpose was not to
deliver comprehensive welfare benefits, but to help the needy get back on
their own feet. To achieve this purpose, the Communist Party of China
(CPC) embarked on a series of economic restructuring measures without
hesitation. These included land reform, cooperativization, collectivization,
and communalization. The changes in the social relations of production, as
Marx had envisaged, were expected to help remove economic destitution
from all segments of Chinese population.
Indeed, this ideological position and practical concerns had direct ramifi-
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2 In the Marxist perspective, as Donzelot(1979) argues, the philanthropically disguised wel-
fare system is needed only in bourgeois society where labor, while subjected to exploitation
and alienation, needs to be maintained in proper quality to ensure smooth operation of the
capitalist production system. 
cations for role division among the state, collective production units, and
peasant families. For peasant welfare, the Communist party-state found its
main role not in financing and administering special welfare programs, but
in abolishing the exploitative social relations of the pre-revolutionary era
through various measures of agricultural collectivization. If some particular
needs of the handicapped or unusually poor required separate care arrange-
ments, then families and/or collective units were to be brought in. That is,
the central government wanted to play as minimal a role as possible in run-
ning self-reliant rural welfare, while fully engaging itself in the task of rapid
urban industrialization (Dixon, 1981). With the state maintaining its mini-
mal importance, the post-revolutionary history of rural welfare had since
been characterized by the role division between the family and the collec-
tive.
Since rural families transferred ownership of land and other productive
assets to collective production organizations in the process of rural collec-
tivization, their basic economic security then had to be collectively ensured.
However, there was a somewhat contradictory policy line advanced to urge
the peasant family to preserve the tradition of mutual support and filial
piety. This was even codified into the 1950 Marriage Law, which stipulated
the duties of parents to “rear and educate their children;” of children to
“support and assist their parents;” and, of husband and wife “to strive joint-
ly for the welfare of the family.” This legalized exhortation for family sup-
port was sustained even when the peasant family lost its autonomous eco-
nomic basis for production in the already collectivized countryside.
Although the principle of self-reliance was introduced to urge localized
financing of material relief, it was further propagated to press for each fami-
ly’s self-support. Facing the burden of amassing investable funds at the
local level and the pressure from most constituent families for maximum
possible income distribution, the emphasis on each family’s self-care was an
indispensable strategy to minimize the numbers in need.3
When collective farms were instituted in the mid 1950s, nevertheless, “the
promise of a welfare system that would provide security for the elderly, the
sick, the widowed, the orphaned, and the handicapped was an important
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3 By the same token, the proportion of the welfare fund in the total collective income was
maintained at low levels. Although this proportion varied widely across different villages,
counties, and provinces, it usually accounted for 1 to 3 percent of the collective income, i.e.,
team income, brigade income, or commune income, depending on the different unit of wel-
fare administration in each period (Dixon, 1981). One exception was the communalization
drive in which rural communes were encouraged to allocate up to 5 percent of their total
income to their welfare fund.
instrument in overcoming the reluctance of peasants to join these [collec-
tives] and give up their land, the traditional source of their security” (Dixon,
1981: 191). Thus, the famous wubao (five guarantees) system was introduced
in most of the collectivized farming communities. Financed from a collective
welfare fund, this system provided some basic needs for a small number of
needy persons and families in each collective. The contents of wubao varied
over time and across regions. Food, clothing, and burial expenses were
mostly included; fuel, school fees, medical care and housing were variably
included.4
When communes were introduced subsequently in the late 1950s, the
communalization of peasant life was further intensified. In this period,
according to Dixon (1981: 196), the wubao system was expanded to seven
guarantees (including food, clothing, housing, health care and sick leave,
maternity benefits, education, and funeral and wedding ceremonies), to ten
guarantees (adding haircuts, entertainment, and heating), or even to sixteen
guarantees (adding lighting, tailoring, upbringing of children, transporta-
tion, a small marriage grant, and old-age care). Furthermore, the communal
(free) supply of these basic necessities was not limited to some destitute
families, but universalized to all families. In addition, communal dining
halls, elderly care centers, nurseries and kindergartens, and specialized
teams for sewing, shoemaking, laundry, and others came to replace the fam-
ily in most aspects of peasant life. As Renmin ribao (October 1, 1958) pro-
claimed, this situation “was not tantamount to the Communist system of ‘to
each according to his needs’, but it has completely broken the barriers of
pay according to labor.” 
Since rural communes were decomposed into smaller units after the dis-
astrous ending of the Great Leap Forward (GLF), the communal welfare
system had to be abandoned as well. Under the so-called three-tier system,
the production team became not only the agricultural production unit, but
also the basic unit of welfare administration.5 The list of guarantees was also
reduced, so that the wubao system was reinstated and has remained to date.
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4 It should be noted that the range of welfare coverage did not fully indicate the strength or
efficacy of collective support. No less important was the level (or amount) of support in each
guarantee. While this varied widely in different areas and in different periods, it was nonethe-
less common that collective support rarely enabled beneficiaries to enjoy conditions compara-
ble to their average neighbors (Parish and Whyte, 1978). Furthermore, collective assistance
carried immense pressure from neighbors and cadres for possible self-sustenance.
5 The three-tier system consisted of team, brigade and commune. The team, the smallest
unit, undertook agricultural production and accounting as well as welfare provision, whereas
the brigade and commune were responsible for relatively large scale projects in education and
health care, using funds from commune- and brigade-run enterprises and other sources.
The post-GLF readjustment period also formalized the system of “five pro-
tection households” covering families of ex-servicemen, revolutionary mar-
tyrs, cadres, and model workers, as well as five-guarantees families (i.e., the
aged, children, the weak, the orphaned, the widowed, and the infirm and
disabled). In addition, if the local situation allowed, families with an unusu-
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TABLE 1. STATE EXPENDITURE FOR RURAL AND URBAN WELFARE (100 million yuan, %)
Total Percent of the total state expenditure
state
expndtr Rural Welfare Prote- Urban Natural
(100 mil relief relief ctive retiree disaster
yuan) funds fundsa pensionb pension relief
1970 649.41 0.48 0.59 0.41c
1975 820.88 0.90 0.42 0.46c 0.69
1978 1122.09 0.61 0.41 0.26 0.21 0.80
1980 1228.83 0.59 0.44 0.37 0.28 0.57
1981 1138.41 0.80 0.45 0.40 0.30 0.76
1982 1229.98 0.70 0.44 0.40 0.28 0.62
1983 1409.52 0.67 0.47 0.38 0.26 0.60
1984 1701.02 0.56 0.47 0.36 0.21 0.44
1985 2004.25 0.64 0.38 0.36 0.24 0.51
1986 2204.91 0.60 0.39 0.40 0.26 0.48
1987 2262.18 0.55 0.40 0.44 0.30 0.44
1988 2491.21 0.53 0.39 0.45 0.30 0.43
1989 2823.78 0.56 0.38 0.51 0.30 0.46
1990 3083.59 0.53 0.39 0.54 0.31 0.43
1991 3386.62 0.76 0.39 0.51 0.30 0.66
1992 3742.20 0.51 0.38 0.49 0.33 0.42
1993 4642.30 0.41 0.37 0.45 0.30 0.33
1994 5792.62 0.40 0.35 0.43 0.35 0.34
1995 6823.72 0.35 0.35 0.43 0.33 0.40
1996 7937.55 0.55 0.37 0.41 0.13 0.49
1997 9233.56 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.15 0.37
1998 10798.18 0.55 0.33 0.37 0.15 0.48
1999 13187.67 0.32 0.37 0.41 0.15 0.26
2000 15886.50 0.38 0.38 0.15 0.18
aNormally used for urban residents.
bPension for disabled persons and bereaved families mostly in urban areas.
cIncludes both protective pension and retiree pension.
Sources: Compiled and computed from ZGTJNJ 1997, pp. 243-246, and ZGTJNJ 2001, pp. 252-255.
ally high dependency ratio or notably insufficient income were supported,
even when they were not classified as “five protection households.”6 During
the Cultural Revolution, familial self-reliance was strongly emphasized
again and, when assistance was granted, proper political attitudes and class
backgrounds were critically considered (Dixon, 1981). Yet, the five protec-
tion families were continuously taken care of in this period and subsequent-
ly in the 1970s.7 Partly because of universal work entitlement in collective
farming and partly because of ideological exhortation for family self-suste-
nance, collectively protected families accounted for a very small segment of
the rural population throughout the Maoist era.
In sum, the historical changes in the organizational basis and in the range
and coverage of collective welfare had direct implications for the self-sup-
porting role of the peasant family, as the negligible contribution of the state
made family self-support the only alternative source of rural welfare (see
Table 1). When the number of guarantees, the amount of assistance in each
guarantee, and the number or categories of protected families were reduced,
it automatically signaled that more peasant families had to depend on them-
selves for more types of basic needs. So far as the collective farming system
ensured all families’ work entitlement and egalitarian income distribution,
self-support was a permanent principle for most families, while collective
welfare was perceived as a means of last resort. The Maoist (and Marxist)
welfare strategy of rectifying the social relations of production first was
upheld faithfully.
Ruralist Welfare as Enfranchisement Differential
As a consequence of this Maoist, or socialist, policy of linking basic needs
provision to work, social welfare was distributed in such a way that the
existing inequality, particularly between urban and rural laborers, was fur-
ther enlarged. As Davis (1989: 578) emphatically argues,
The leadership endorsed the ideals of universalizing primary education,
bringing health-care to under-served areas and protecting all citizens
against the ravages of destitution in old age, but in practice, social ser-
vices were not distributed according to the need of individuals, but
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6 Besides these criteria, thorough consultations were undertaken among various groups,
including potential beneficiaries, collective leaders, mass organizations (the Poor Peasants’
Association and the Women’s Federation), and other ordinary members in order to effectively
limit welfare assistance to truly needy families.
7 However, the qualifications as cadres and model workers gradually became insignificant
in the latter period.
according to the worthiness of the job status. As a result, “welfare goods”
. . . were rationed according to the value the regime placed on certain
workers in specific segments of the workforce. . . [The] welfare policy
consistently favoured the urban residents and employees in heavy indus-
try over the rural residents and employees of a co-operative or collective
on the grounds that the former, as members of the most advanced class
working in the vanguard sectors, deserved higher rewards.
Roughly speaking, there was an urban-rural welfare disparity proportional
to the widely known urban-rural income inequality.8 As compared to vil-
lagers, city dwellers were “aristocratized” by bountiful welfare benefits
(Zhang, Du, and Li, 1992: 110). 
This micro-social outcome of welfare differentials between peasants and
workers should be understood in the context of the macro-economic and
political structure of developmental differentials between rural agricultural
collectives and urban state enterprises. Both rural agricultural collectives
and urban state enterprises were legitimate elements of the socialist econo-
my, but the main developmental strategy of heavy industrialization necessi-
tated the concentration of critical economic and social resources in urban
areas and the austere self-subsistence of the rural population. Despite the
failure of the initial Communist insurrections in cities in the revolutionary
history, the densely aggregated heavy industrial workers in post-revolution-
ary Chinese cities never stopped appearing as a potentially threatening
force to the CPC. Thus, the socialist state decided to enfranchise urban
workers through a very co-optative mechanism of the danwei (work unit)
system. State enterprises, by definition, constituted an economic responsibil-
ity of the state, but workers therein, by choice, constituted a political respon-
sibility of the state. Rural collectives, by definition, were supposed to oper-
ate as autonomous associations of producers, but peasants therein, by
choice, were practically detached from the state under the rubric of ziligeng-
sheng (self-reliance).
Each danwei, albeit with some differences across enterprises and regions,
provided its workers with such comprehensive material, social, and cultural
benefits that White (1998: 177) termed it “the micro welfare state.” The bene-
fits list included not only permanent employment and retiree security, but
also housing, schooling, health care, injury protection, maternity protection,
child care, cultural life, and even funeral/burial (Dixon, 1981). This list was
almost tantamount to what Chinese rural population in many areas experi-
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8 For the general situation of urban welfare on the eve of Deng’s reform, see Whyte and
Parish (1984).
enced briefly (though only on paper) under the supposed achievement of
Communism during the Great Leap Forward period. On the part of the
rural population, their experience of on-paper Communism required a
human toll of somewhere between fifteen to thirty million deaths. On the
part of urban workers, their practical experience of near-Communism was
buttressed by an unwavering state commitment to urban heavy industrial-
ization and proletarian representation which, in turn, demanded the ulti-
mate sacrifice of the rural population.
In this milieu, the practical reliance on familial social support for peasant
welfare, along with the limited public investment in agriculture, reflected a
fundamentally ruralist political position of the Communist party-state.
Ruralism denotes “all those social, cultural, political, and economic ideas
and actions about rural people and places that have been devised and
implemented by urban-based elite groups to justify urban-centered pro-
grams of economic and social transformation, and necessitate self-negating
changes (and non-changes) in rural people’s everyday lives” (Chang, 2003).
Ruralism, while reflecting the interests of urban economic, political, and
social groups, rather than the realities of rural people’s lives, exerts a formi-
dable self-fulfilling power by inducing and coercing rural people to comply
with the specific ways of thinking, acting, and relating described or, more
precisely, prescribed therein. The supposedly Confucian virtue of familial
social support, as it was asymmetrically demanded to collective farmers
under the urban-centered political economic system, constituted a critical
element of ruralist socialism in post-revolutionary China. Post-Mao reform
has fundamentally revised the ruralist development strategy in many
aspects, but welfare ruralism has been strengthened due to the reasons expli-
cated below.
DECOLLECTIVIZATION AND PEASANT WELFARE
A double-edged threat to peasant welfare was caused by rural decollec-
tivization. The inevitable weakening of collective welfare was paradoxically
accompanied by an increasing need for it due to a rapid increase in the
number of economically threatened families in the increasingly market-ori-
ented economy. The dissolution of collective farming inevitably disrupted,
on the one hand, the entitlement system of work and, on the other hand, the
organizational and financial basis of welfare assistance. As Chow(1988: 60)
pointed out,
Though this practice [of collective welfare] has been continued in some
RURALIST WELFARE REFORM IN CHINA 157
communes ..., most local governments have obviously found it difficult to
enforce, as peasants are now largely responsible for their own piece of
land. As a result, many needy members who have no families to rely on
are left unattended to . . . [T]he way in which assistance is provided in the
villages is extremely unorganized and a more rational system is urgently
called for.
Thus, state intervention was urgently needed to stabilize peasant welfare
that was threatened by rural decollectivization. Yet the Chinese state was
not organizationally and financially ready to supplant, or even supplement,
the waning collective welfare system. There even was devolution of state
welfare responsibility from the central government to provincial govern-
ments in 1985. It was only “hoped” (Hussain and Feuchtwang, 1988: 70) that
collectivism would survive in protecting destitute neighbors at least. 
Table 2 shows, for illustration, the size and composition of collective wel-
fare expenditure at Dahe People’s Commune in Hebei Province between
1970 and 1985. At this commune, each team’s collective welfare budget and
actual welfare spending on average increased gradually in the 1970s and the
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TABLE 2. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF COLLECTIVE WELFARE EXPENDITURE OF DAHE’S
PRODUCTION TEAMS, 1970-1985 (yuan)
Balance Current Total Support Education Health
from year welfare for expense care & Other
prior year addition expense needy sanitation
1970 254.8 258.5 169.8 14.0 3.2 55.3 19.4
1971 340.6 213.7 187.3 13.8 5.5 53.1 24.5
1972 390.2 202.4 191.7 7.1 0.9 56.1 32.3
1973 358.7 220.2 206.0 18.3 3.2 62.9 68.4
1974 347.9 243.1 195.7 20.8 2.2 76.0 53.4
1975 608.7 295.1 142.7 18.1 2.2 101.9 45.2
1976 454.6 200.0 130.0 8.5 5.0 83.9 9.9
1977 652.0 407.0 340.1 10.9 6.6 141.0 119.6
1978 750.2 734.8 435.8 11.9 6.0 132.3 72.2
1979 1440.2 1023.0 407.6 106.5 31.9 112.2 118.5
1980 1389.2 1143.4 656.9 50.6 16.3 151.6 482.0
1981 1833.2 1190.3 660.5 55.9 13.4 59.6 531.8
1982 2314.6 1064.2 786.0 40.2 39.7 46.7 636.6
1983 2536.3 582.5 805.6 50.9 154.7 38.3 565.0
1984 2272.3 438.7 664.6 89.6 139.9 20.5 418.4
1985 2070.5 523.3 510.8 39.3 129.3 5.6 349.2
Source: Author’s analysis of the original survey data (Putterman, ed., 1989).
early 1980s, and tapered off subsequently. Support for needy team members
was larger in the 1980s than in the 1970s (except for 1979), but it is notable
how small the amount of support was. Even when all support had been dis-
tributed to a few families, this could not have provided anything near bare
subsistence. A more serious problem is observed concerning health care and
sanitation. Although health care programs had been administered at the
brigade level in most localities, it is clearly shown that a rapid reduction of
collective health care resources was caused by rural decollectivization.
Without question, the maintenance of the wubao system is the key issue in
post-collective welfare reform. Official statistics in Table 3 show that the
proportion of the wubao recipients supported by collective units increased
until 1983, and then sharply decreased in 1985 — the year when rural collec-
tive units were formally dissolved to be replaced by general administrative
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TABLE 3. COLLECTIVE SUPPORT FOR WUBAO FAMILIES IN THE REFORM ERA
Collective
Collective Per






1978 3150 2678 85.0 12571 46.9
1980 2944 2539 86.2 17223 66.0
1981 2899 2595 89.5 20368 79.3
1982 2989 2690 90.0 28455 107.7
1983 2951 2838 96.2 33867 122.5
1984 2961 2691 90.9 41866 151.4
1985 3008 2238 74.4 52854 214.5
1986 2932 2204 75.2 50526 227.5
1987 2876 2190 76.1 60000 273.1
1988 2826 2072 73.3 64574 303.0
1989 3217 2224 69.1 74922 348.8
1990 2837 2064 72.8 73411 342.4
1991 2844 2039 71.7 81577 400.0
1992 2669 1894 71.0 75558 398.9
1996 2675 2130 79.6 160275 752.5 
1997 2791 2003 71.8 170406 850.8
1998 2828 2009 71.0 180639 899.1
1999 3037 1954 64.3 179646 919.4
2000 2706 2081 76.9 204754 983.9
Sources: Adapted from ZGSHTJZL 1993, p. 121, and ZGTJNJ 2001, p. 767.
organizations. The total number of wubao recipients did not increase, but
fluctuated in the 1980s and 1990s. Since the rural (as well as the national)
population continued to increase despite the stringent birth control policy,
such fluctuation actually meant the diminution of collective welfare. Of
course, given the improvement in the general economic status of the rural
population in this period, the desired number/proportion of wubao recipi-
ents may well have declined. However, it is also true that economic reform
disadvantaged and alienated various segments of the rural population into
desperate living conditions. Thus, the desired number/proportion of wubao
recipients could have increased. Despite such possibilities, the support
amount per recipient kept increasing gradually, so as to keep abreast with
the run-away inflation of this period. 
Besides immediate practical problems of organizing and financing social
security measures, the Chinese government has been confronted with a the-
oretical problem of profound significance. As welfare protection could not
be universally provided as part of collective work arrangements in the
decollectivized countryside, a separate system for specifically delivering
welfare assistance was needed. In other words, due to the changes in rural
production relations, the Maoist (and Marxist) strategy of collectively
enabling people to acquire basic social and material needs could no longer
be upheld. Even when some localities have been successful in preserving
mutual assistance programs, these now have to be managed with resources
separately mobilized for collective welfare. Thus the specific and sustained
commitment of cadres and villagers to the programs is required. On the part
of the state, rural welfare is now a social policy that requires its own theoreti-
cal, organizational, and financial ground, somewhat independent of general
economic management.
As the reform leadership now has to develop welfare programs as a sepa-
rate social policy in the absence of collective economic organizations ensur-
ing minimum security and welfare, it seems to have two alternatives:
expanding the role of the state in welfare programs directly oriented to
needy groups, or encouraging families to reinforce traditional functions of
social support (with or without financial incentives). The establishment and
expansion of private welfare services in the market may be considered still
another option, but its applicability is fundamentally limited in small, poor
communities like Chinese villages. It is all too clear which policy option the
state has taken for rural welfare. Throughout the reform era, the peasant
family has had to function as the only effective welfare institution for most
rural population. As Chow (1988: 74) noticed,
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For a long time, traditional networks like the family system have been
neglected and at times even suppressed for playing protective functions...
But the omission of these traditional networks have not diminished their
importance as the majority of the Chinese still cannot get the most basic
provisions from the state... In its proposal for a new social security system
in China, the Ministry [of Civil Affairs] emphasized in particular the roles
played by the family system; it is probably a lesson which the Ministry
has learned from its work with the needy in the villages.
The reality does not differ from this governmental (in)action. Based upon
their field observations of a Shandong village, Xu and Yang (1994: 211) con-
cluded that “the family takes care of every individual’s shenglaobingsi”
(birth, aging, illness, and death, i.e., the entire life course) as the core institu-
tion for social security. Although the overall improvement of rural living
standards since reform has been impressive, the burden of economically
and socially protecting needy people has rapidly fallen onto the family.
The revised marriage law of 1980 clearly represents this wishful position
of the Chinese state. The 1980 Marriage Law reiterated, as legal codes, filial
obligation and other elements of family mutual support. Again, legally stip-
ulated were the duties of parents “to rear and educate their children;” of
children “to support and assist their parents;” and, of husband and wife “to
support and assist each other.” Also stipulated were the duties, when
affordable, of paternal and maternal grandparents “to support and assist
underaged grandchildren whose parents are deceased;” of grandchildren
“to give support to their paternal and maternal grandparents whose chil-
dren are deceased;” and, of elder brothers and sisters “to support and assist
underaged younger brothers and sisters whose parents are deceased or
unable to provide.” 
The new marriage law, if compared to the 1950 Marriage Law, expanded
the legal range of support relations as the prime institution for welfare pro-
tection beyond the confine of the nuclear family to “extended” family and
kin members. Amidst the rapid process of rural economic diversification,
the expanding relations of economic cooperation among family and kin
members also stimulate the relations of mutual material support among
them (Chang, 1993). However, regardless of these individual economic cir-
cumstances, the family as a universal (and virtually sole) rural welfare insti-
tution is socially founded on nothing other than the traditional Confucian
ethic of familial economic collectivism. While this is flatly difficult to ideo-
logically justify, the Confucian family has become an indispensable part of
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9 The comparison of the American and the Japanese welfare systems is illuminating because
China’s socialism on its material protection side.9 This ideological work in
(rural) welfare has been continually perfected as familial social support is
even constitutionally stipulated, legally included in matrimonial pledges,
and adopted as a core topic for formal school education and home educa-
tion (Croll, 1999).
The Confucian tradition of familial social support inevitably exploits hier-
archical gender relations. The destabilization of collective welfare services
and the familial labor shortage amid rapid economic diversification have
required a home-based group of rural workers who undertake family farm-
ing and family care simultaneously (Chang, 2000). The theory — more pre-
cisely, ideology — of zirenfengong (natural division of work) has been openly
discussed by Chinese scholars (Judd, 1990). On the part of rural people, it
has been practiced out of necessity as more and more villages are deserted
by men and young people either seasonally or permanently. Middle-aged
women have been in charge of both familial agricultural production and
familial social support for elderly, children, etc. (Meng, 1994, 1996). The con-
servative approach of the state to rural social policy has necessitated a sort
of welfare gender in the place of the yet-to-arrive welfare state. 
On the financial front of welfare, however, many rural communities man-
aged to compensate for the budgetary crisis ensuing from agricultural
decollectivization by tapping the unexpected economic opportunity of rural
collective industrialization. The official endorsement of rural industrial
diversification in 1984 was echoed by a literally explosive expansion of rural
industrial and commercial activities, most of which were either collectively
run or closely backed by local interest (Zhou, 1996). In the beginning, this
was more or less a country-wide phenomenon. The profits, taxes, and con-
tributions from these rural industries not only filled local collective coffers,
but also enriched entire villages in the mid-to-late 1980s. Many villages
began to rebuild health clinics, nurseries, schools, and elderly homes.10
Some rural industries were designed to create jobs for handicapped persons,
elders, etc. (Kim, 2000). Besides, many villagers employed in rural enterpris-
es were the first rural group to be incorporated in social insurance because
their work contract included it. These developments were warmly praised
162 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
they seem to by and large parallel the two options available in China. According to Preston
and Kono (1988), the family-dependent Japanese system has been much less costly and more
effective than the formally institutionalized American system. In this regard, the Chinese
strategy of enlarging the welfare function of the family may be somewhat justified, consider-
ing China’s cultural proximity to Japan and pressing financial difficulty. 
10 See Kim (2000: 551-76) for a detailed description of this process in Dongyingcun,
Shandong.
by the central government as it was thereby allowed to maintain its obsti-
nate abstinence from peasant welfare in decollectivized villages (Wong,
1987). 
However, the reliance of peasant welfare on rural industries was not long
sustainable in many areas for the following reasons. First, both the central
and local governments were overwhelmingly concerned about rural eco-
nomic development over peasant welfare, and concurred on policy changes
to allow the “more productive use” (i.e., investment) of enterprise profits
(Davis, 1989). There even were policy changes concerning the use of state
and collective welfare funds to induce their “productive use.” Second, by
the early 1990s, their viability of rural industries began to be threatened in
many interior regions, whose local protectionism gradually crumbled under
the raid of commodities from more competitive coastal regions. The region-
ally asymmetrical development of rural industries became one of the main
causes of the economic disparities between eastern coastal regions and
western interior regions.11 Third, in many areas, both cadres and villagers
remain skeptical about the efficiency of collective management of rural
industries, so that the management and/or ownership of many collective
rural enterprises have been privatized.12 At the time of privatization, the
collective coffer is actually enriched by the prices paid by private entrepre-
neurs, but privatized enterprises cannot be relied on as a financial basis for
rural welfare. The regional and temporal limit of rural industry-backed
peasant welfare became apparent by the mid 1990s, so that familial self-sup-
port has remained the only universal mechanism for peasant welfare there-
after.
The strains and dilemmas in welfare provision are almost universal across
China, except in some rich villages. Proposals and discussions about new
systems of rural welfare are not rare. Some localities have experimented
with new, voluntary measures for peasant welfare. New forms of social
security organizations include local security networks and social security
fund associations (for poor people relief and mutual saving). Even private
philanthropy and individual insurance policies are encouraged in many
localities (Davis, 1989). Inevitably, there are wide interregional variations in
the new welfare arrangements. According to official data in Zhonguo renkou
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11 Nongyebu (1996), “Xiangzhenqiye dongxi hezuo shifan gongcheng fangan” (The Model
Process Method of East-West Cooperation of Township and Town Enterprises), in Zhongguo
xiangzhenqiye nianjian 1996, pp. 79-119, Beijing: Zhongguonongyechubanshe.
12 For instance, village cadres I interviewed at Dahe, Hebei in September 2003 candidly
expressed their belief in the superior efficiency of private enterprises. They were satisfied to
use the rents, taxes, and contributions from privatized enterprises.
tongji nianjian (China Population Statistical Yearbook), it is in rich areas that
redistributive types of collective social security have been implemented. In
poor areas, reciprocal help organizations such as mutual saving have been
common. Many field observations have shown that these new efforts have
confronted many unfavorable social and political conditions created by
rural reform — i.e., the lack of stable institutional arrangements, the ineffi-
cacy of ideological exhortation, and the increased mobility of villagers.
These tendencies make it difficult to induce villagers’ sustained commit-
ment to local mutual assistance. 
MARKET SOCIALISM AND RURALIST WELFARE REFORM
While the above evidence sufficiently demonstrates that the Chinese state
has tried to minimize its obligation for rural welfare by using (or abusing)
the family moral relations for mutual support, the extent and significance of
such strategic dependence on the peasant family can be somewhat indirect-
ly delineated by examining the urban-rural differences in state-supported
welfare benefits. In urban areas, the desocialization (or privatization) of eco-
nomic organizations has not yet taken place in full scale, so that socialist
welfare benefits have not necessarily been threatened due to institutional
changes. Furthermore, the asymmetrical state commitment to urban welfare
— one of the few state policies that were consistently maintained regardless
of the political and economic vicissitudes — has been further reinforced in
the reform period.
It is the very reform policy for urban state enterprises that has induced
the expansion of welfare spending on workers. For many years, managers
of state enterprises used their enlarged managerial autonomy — a mecha-
nism which state leaders hoped would facilitate profit-seeking and budget-
economizing — to increase workers’ bonuses and welfare at the expense of
state revenues (Walder, 1987, 1989; Baek, 2001). Well into the 1990s, the com-
prehensive danwei welfare system — a core element of Chinese-style social-
ism — was preserved for most of the regular employees in state enterprises,
even when many of them were generating losses. Numerous loss-generat-
ing enterprises were saved from bankruptcy primarily for the sake of their
employees’ jobs and welfare (see Table 4). Ironically, the danwei welfarism of
state and collective enterprises has spilled over into many newly established
enterprises, such as private and joint-venture enterprises. This has occurred
under strong political pressure from local cadres and workers and/or for
the economic consideration of scouting and keeping competent workers
(Francis, 1996).
164 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
In stark contrast to openly neglected peasant welfare, there has been a
wide array of political efforts to ensure the stability of workers’ welfare, par-
ticularly in state enterprises. The reform of urban state enterprises has
required the increasing responsibility of workers to share the budget for
various social security programs, usually in terms of scheduled insurance
premiums (Guojiajingjitizhigaigeweiyuanhui, ed., 1995). Newly proposed or
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TABLE 4. STATE SUBSIDIES FOR STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND URBAN RESIDENTS
(unit: hundred million yuan)
Subsidies for Food price
deficit-making subsidies for
state enterprisesa urban residentsb








1985 507.0 (25.3) 261.8 (14.0)
1986 324.8 (14.7) 257.5 (11.0)
1987 376.4 (16.6) 294.6 (12.0)
1988 446.5 (17.9) 316.8 (11.7)
1989 598.9 (21.2) 370.3 (12.2)
1990 578.9 (18.8) 380.8 (11.0)
1991 510.2 (15.1) 373.8 (9.8)
1992 445.0 (11.9) 321.6 (7.3)
1993 411.3 (8.9) 299.3 (5.7)
1994 366.2 (6.3) 314.5 (5.4)
1995 327.8 (4.8) 364.9 (5.3)
1996 337.4 (4.3) 453.9 (5.7)
1997 368.5 (4.0) 552.0 (6.0)
1998 333.5 (3.1) 712.1 (6.6)
1999 290.0 (2.2) 697.6 (5.3)
2000 278.8 (1.8) 1042.3 (6.6)
aSubsidies for loss-making state enterprises became a separate budget-accounting item in 1986.
bAll price subsidies for consumers were provided for urban-registered residents only.
Source: Compiled and computed from data in ZGTJNJ 2001, pp. 247-251.
implemented insurances for old-age support, health care, unemployment,
and industrial accidents have these co-payment arrangements. However,
the actual adoption of co-payment schemes for such insurance programs
has not relieved most state enterprises of welfare burdens in any meaning-
ful sense. Their expenses for social insurance premiums and other in-cash
supports by state regulations amount to about half the total wage payments:
as of the late 1990s, 22 percent for old age insurance, 11 percent for health
insurance, 3 percent for unemployment insurance, 1 percent for industrial
accident insurance, 1 percent for childbirth, 2 percent for educational
expenses, 3 percent for worker welfare, and 2 percent for labor union
expenses (Lee, 2003).
Furthermore, various in-company social services also amount to about
half the total wage payments (Lee, 2003). Included in the list are employee
housing, hospital, school, nursery, kindergarten, stores, and cultural facili-
ties. It has been an important official reform policy to encourage privatiza-
tion and abolition of these social services because the incurred expenses
even exceed the total profits in many state enterprises. But the response of
enterprise managers, not to mention that of workers, has been extremely
slow. Even when these services are replaced by private means in the market,
many enterprises subsidize workers in various ways. Some enterprises have
purchased these services from the market in order to provide them for
workers permanently. It is undeniable that the privatization and marketiza-
tion of social services such as education, medicine, and housing have rapid-
ly taken place in urban areas. Much of this trend, however, reflects the
growing demands of affluent urban residents for better-quality schools, hos-
pitals, and houses.
Urban workers have to increasingly rely on the market for basic goods
and services. In particular, the abolition of liangpiao (grain coupon) in most
provinces has produced enormous financial pressure on urban worker
households because of rapidly rising grain prices. Inflation has been practi-
cally an essential means of reform — e.g., raising prices for agricultural
products in the early stage of reform, abolition of regulatory (low) prices for
various industrial inputs, and market-based price determination of con-
sumer goods. In the mid 1980s, however, the Chinese government acted
quickly to freeze grain procurement prices, and to provide price subsidies
for various basic goods. Throughout the 1980s, these price subsidies alone
amounted to more than 10 percent of the total state budget, even exceeding
the entire defense budget in many years (see Table 4). Ironically, as shown in
Table 5, Chinese food producers have continued to suffer from rural-urban
nutritional inequalities even when they have clearly outperformed urban
166 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
residents in economic activities.
The proportion of regular employees in state enterprises has continued to
decline, and unemployed and underemployed workers suffer from severe
poverty and insecurity in rapidly growing numbers. Nonetheless, these
unfortunate workers still constitute a minority, and are given special consid-
erations in economic activities wherever available. For instance, the institu-
tionalization of xiagang (going down to the edge) attests to not only the eco-
nomic effort for enterprise restructuring, but also the political consideration
to provide a temporary material buffer for unneeded workers. Xiagang
workers are those who are temporarily laid-off due to critical managerial
problems, but still maintain employment contracts and receive compensato-
ry payments. As of the end of 2000, there were 9.11 million such workers,
with 6.57 million belonging to state enterprises (Lee, 2003). Xiagang is an
interesting socialist strategy of achieving labor market flexibility. It also
needs to be pointed out that many of those who quit state enterprises do so
to enjoy even better material conditions by working in lucrative private
and/or foreign enterprises. It is common for married couples to diversify
their employment in state and foreign/private sectors. In this way, a couple
can enjoy the perks of rich welfare benefits provided by a state enterprise
and the high wage income paid by a foreign/private enterprise. 
Not all urban workers are beneficiaries in this regard as the urban indus-
trial structure has become increasingly heterogeneous and as non-state sec-
tor workers outside the administrative boundary for welfare provision
(such as contract construction workers and informal sector peddlers) have
disproportionately increased (S. Chang, 1996). However, an increasing pro-
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TABLE 5. RURAL-URBAN NUTRITIONAL INEQUALITIES (per capita consumption kg)
1981 1985 1990 1995 2000
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Graina 257 135 262 131 259 97 249 82
Vegetable 124 152 131 144 134 139 104 116 112 115
Edible oil 3.1 4.8 4.0 5.8 5.2 6.4 5.8 7.1 7.1 8.2
Meat, poultry 9.4 20.5 12.0 22.0 12.6 25.2 13.1 23.6 18.3 25.5
Eggs 1.2 5.2 2.0 6.8 2.4 7.2 3.2 9.7 5.0 11.2
Seafood 1.3 7.3 1.6 7.1 2.1 7.7 3.1 9.2 3.5 9.9
Sugar 1.1 2.9 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.1 1.3 1.7 1.3 1.7
aRefers to unprocessed grains for rural households.
Sources: Compiled and computed from the sections on “People’s Livelihood” in SYC 1988, ZGTJNJ
1997, ZGTJNJ 2001.
portion of non-state sector workers are migrants from rural areas (Yang and
Goldstein, 1990), so that their rural origin — to the extent that it implies
their administrative exclusion from state-sector employment — perpetuates
the pre-migration disadvantages in social welfare (Solinger, 1999). In other
words, the welfare disparity between peasants and state employees has
been replicated in the urban arena between peasants-turned-workers and
state employees. Thus, for the peasant population, the family must continue
to function as a central welfare institution whether they remain in the coun-
tryside or move to cities. 
In sum, market socialism in China has practically reinforced the rural-
urban divide in social welfare. The danwei welfare system for urban workers
has remained robust, albeit now through different programs for social secu-
rity. The market-based and/or private arrangements for social insurances
and services complement, not replace, the danwei-supported welfare pro-
grams. In contrast, the demise of rural collective institutions has caused a
desocialization of peasant welfare in most villages across China as individ-
ual families are urged to self-support on the basis of private economic and
social resources. Welfare ruralism has exhorted mainly peasants (and peasant
migrants) to revitalize their traditional values and functions for familial
social support in place of state-sponsored social security programs or social
services. What Gordon White (1998: 192) dubbed “post-communist neo-
Confucianism, involving the conscious manufacture of a set of alleged
truths about the Chinese welfare heritage,” has been asymmetrically
enforced on to rural population. Welfare ruralism is a sort of internal orien-
talism applied to peasant welfare for which ideological and cultural work is
the main mechanism for reform. It is amazing how openly and consistently
the policy discussions about social security reform have alienated the
world’s largest peasant population.
CONCLUSION
A paradox of rural reform is that a rapid increase of needy people in the
increasingly privatized and marketized economic environment has been
met with an abrupt dismantling of the collective mechanisms for welfare
provision — a direct corollary of the decomposition of collective production
organizations themselves. That is, rural decollectivization in China not only
entailed an organizational restructuring of various production activities, but
also ramified a fundamental dismantling of the rural welfare system. While
rural production is now formally delegated to individual peasant families
through various systems of household production responsibility, rural welfare
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has been neither formally assigned to individual peasant families nor incor-
porated into the state-organized and financed welfare programs. Instead, a
sort of household welfare responsibility has deceptively emerged under which
the morally defined relations of mutual support in the family are now
acclaimed as a genuine socialist element of Chinese society.
The Confucian family tradition of moral relations of mutual support, even
encompassing grandparents, grandchildren, and married siblings, has been
formally encouraged for peasant welfare as a functional equivalent to the
welfare state, whereas public welfare benefits continue to be the exclusive
privileges of official urban residents. Although this ideological exhortation
for familial social support is not formally confined to the rural population,
policy-makers cannot miss the reality that “the Chinese urban family hardly
conforms to the Confucian stereotype” (White, 1998: 193). After all,
Confucianism is a legacy of China’s agrarian millenia in the past. In short,
post-Mao welfare reform has been openly and tenaciously ruralist, and few
peasants seem to appreciate the culturalist manipulation of rural life even
when they actually abide by traditional norms for familial social support. 
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